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Introduction
On 14 July 2006, Hezbollah provided a telling illustration of the potential of hybrid war when members of the group fired Chinese-made, C-802 anti-ship missiles from a coastal town in southern Lebanon. That a non-state actor possessed this modern weapon system was significant. More importantly, the group was able to damage an Israeli warship in the Mediterranean with the missiles while Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of the armed group, explained the action live on globally broadcast television.
1 This event further defined hybrid war. Groups postured for hybrid war exist in the middle of the conflict spectrum between the loosely organized insurgent and the traditional state military. 2 These organizations blend with their ideologically committed population and use a potent mix of modern weaponry, high quality conventional battlefield preparation, and small-unit guerilla tactics including terrorism. 3 The month-long Israeli assault on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 is a textbook example of hybrid war, and disturbingly, one that the IDF fought poorly. fighting a state, and that its ground force relied too much on its recent experience conducting a decades-long counterinsurgency in southern Lebanon.
By 2008, after thoroughly reviewing its operational doctrine and training, the IDF performed more effectively in a similar conflict against Hamas, another group postured for hybrid war. During its brief incursion into the Gaza Strip, the IDF used tough, and in many ways traditional, urban combined arms techniques integrated with good intelligence. 6 The U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center studied the two operations and focused on the Israelis' return to proven operational techniques, pointedly titling the work -Back to Basics.‖ 7 With many observers suggesting that hybrid wars are likely to occur with increasing frequency in the future, states concerned with maintaining their ability to enforce international order might look to the success of the recent IDF operation in Gaza as a model for fighting hybrid war.
However, while the Israeli operation in Gaza against Hamas in 2008 was effective in some ways, the U.S. military should not look to the operation as a model for defeating groups postured for hybrid war.
This paper examines the unresolved operational challenges that remain after looking at the IDF's performance against Hezbollah and Hamas. First, it examines the structure of hybrid war and the IDF's operational template. Next, it looks at the problem of the population connected to the two groups. Whether against Hamas or Hezbollah, the fighting took place within civilian areas and often with civilians integrated in the fighting in ways significantly different than in other types of warfare. Then, the paper examines the IDF's operational objectives. Both Hamas and Hezbollah retained legitimacy and maintained a significant military capability. While effective by some measures, the IDF's operating concept does not provide a good match with the objectives it achieved. Finally, the paper looks at information management. Both Hamas and Hezbollah defined victory simply as not losing and effectively manipulated the media environment. 8 Although the IDF experience provides some insights into information operations (IO), there are still significant challenges in countering adversaries who can so easily control their message. In closing, the paper provides some insights into the problem of hybrid war for U.S. military commanders.
Hybrid Posture
Hezbollah and Hamas are examples of groups postured for hybrid war. In both cases
Israel faced an adversary with well-planned urban defenses including tunnels, reinforced concrete bunkers, roadside bombs, booby traps, and elaborately placed weapons caches.
Additionally, both had sophisticated weapons including surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles while Hezbollah had anti-ship missiles and even a limited Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) capability. Although Hezbollah fighters were better trained and more effective in combat, both armed groups operated in small, decentralized cells. 9 Overall, the groups had a sophisticated defensive plan.
Hezbollah and Hamas also relied on support from donor states. By some estimates, Iran sends $100 million to Hezbollah each year. 10 Additionally, Hezbollah flies militants from Syria to Iran for training while also receiving arms shipments from both countries.
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Hamas receives less illicit aid because its borders are more closely guarded. 17 The IDF experience provides insights into timely release of information at the lowest levels, balancing operational security with the publics' need for information, and a robust professional and amateur combat camera capability, among others. 18 Overall, the IDF conducted credible information operations.
As a recent conflict against a hybrid-postured adversary, one could argue that the U.S.
military should look to the IDF experience as an operational template for fighting hybrid war.
Much of what the IDF learned during the two brief conflicts about combining traditional urban operations with air support and good intelligence could be viewed as applicable for the U.S. military. However, the IDF's model has serious shortcomings that make it dangerous as an operational roadmap for hybrid war.
People
Critically, the two, month-long assaults unavoidably killed and injured civilians and caused severe destruction to civilian infrastructure. The IDF began its 2006 operation in southern Lebanon after a Hezbollah raiding team killed several civilians and kidnapped two soldiers. By the war's end, well over 1,000 Lebanese had been killed and over 4,000
wounded. Furthermore, nearly 8,000 houses were destroyed with 100,000 more sustaining damage. 19 In towns along the border, or where there had been heavy fighting, 50-90 percent of the structures, including schools, mosques, and clinics, were destroyed. 20 In fact,
Hezbollah's use of mosques and day-care centers as fighting positions and sites for weapons caches was intentional. The use of civilian buildings was central to its strategy of making the Israeli operation look disproportional by inducing civilian casualties and damage.
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Although using a significantly better operational plan for its assault into Gaza, IDF operations killed non-combatants and destroyed civilian infrastructure. Against Hamas, the IDF estimated that 1,300 Palestinians had been killed with possibly half being fighters.
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Additionally, the assault destroyed 4,000 houses with another 17,000 damaged. 23 The IDF made efforts to minimize civilian deaths through pre-attack notifications and precise targeting, but also used highly destructive techniques like avoiding mined and booby trapped roads by driving armored bulldozers through houses in order create movement corridors. Hezbollah is not among the people or separate from the people; it is against the people. To modify the Clausewitzian analogy, the effect is more of concentric circles than of a triangle.
The governmental figures at the core expand outward to the party members who blend with varying degrees of fighters and the general population. Therefore, the problem faced in fighting hybrid war is how to achieve operational objectives when much of the operating environment will be filled with complicit civilians. 
Information
Although the IDF developed a better information management model for its assault into Gaza, it does not provide a template for victory in the battle of impressions with key audiences. As a result of its experiences in southern Lebanon, the IDF made significant changes to its posture on information. As noted, the IDF banned cell phones and barred reporters from the battlefield. At the same time, it used public affairs officials to provide accurate and timely information to Arab, Israeli, and the broader publics about the goals of the operation and its progress. Overall, the IDF significantly improved its control of information while satisfying the publics' need for an explanation of events.
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While the IDF controlled the information surrounding its military operation, for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, military operations are secondary to information.
Hezbollah's primary objective during the Second Lebanon War was to increase its legitimacy and attract followers to its cause by demonstrating the ability to resist the IDF assault.
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Hezbollah put reporters from Al-Manar, its own 24-hour satellite TV station, on nearly all operations. 47 The group also ran its own radio and internet sites where it could highlight successful attacks on the IDF, as well as dramatize civilian casualties, while using sophisticated photo and video editing to present a biased view of the war. 48 A Hezbollah-like adversary can set a low bar for military success because its primary goal is simply to demonstrate resistance publicly. As such, the hybrid adversary wins an information victory every time it can show proof of resistance.
Additionally, groups like Hamas and Hezbollah can manipulate the media to a greater extent than a state actor. While states must adhere to international norms for collecting, analyzing, and discerning the truth of events, non-state groups are free from accountability.
As such, a hybrid adversary can be faster with information. 49 For example, Hezbollah ensured that its supporters understood the importance of the message that only civilians were in southern Lebanon. When people were killed in the fighting, those interacting with the media knew to say that the dead and injured had been civilians. This information campaign made all casualties appear to be civilian causalities in media reports regardless of the truth of individual actions on the ground. 50 Furthermore, Hezbollah specifically put weapon systems and caches near homes or schools with the hope that they would be targeted and thus garner an information advantage. 51 Similarly, Hamas transformed civilians and infrastructure into legitimate targets for the IDF in order to capture the information victory when those individuals or sites were targeted. 52 In some cases, members of Hamas even staged casualties for camera crews in order to get maximum value from an event.
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Finally, destroyed infrastructure and dead civilians, whether real or exaggerated, are a severe information challenge. In both cases, while trying to limit damage, the IDF caused thousands of casualties and significant destruction in civilian areas. The IDF could sometimes point to clear evidence of a civilian site being used specifically to shield military activities. However, Hamas had limitless access to the reality of post-strike images of a destroyed mosque or school. Farquhar, 109. of destruction played to the message of resistance. 54 Additionally, in both cases, the IDF caused hundreds of times more casualties than the specific events that sparked the conflict.
Regardless of how the message is crafted, this truth makes for a decidedly uphill information battle when following the IDF template.
For the U.S. military, an aggressive assault through a civilian population using the IDF model would be a significant informational challenge. It could expect to have all casualties described as -civilian,‖ with faked, exaggerated, and staged video and photo -evidence‖ fed to the world media in real-time. Additionally, the information battle would be central to the hybrid adversaries' plan, while the United States would be focused on military victories. The IDF's operational template does not adequately address these information management issues. In no case would a U.S. military commander be able to explain adequately the proportionality of causing thousands more civilian deaths than the event that sparked the original incident.
Recommendations
Although a hybrid war poses some dangerous challenges, an operational commander need not be committed to entering one symmetrically like the IDF did against both Hezbollah Cambanis, 220. outside sources of support. Attacking a hybrid group through a complex combined arms operation is not the best method to produce useful results. An assault on what would essentially be the population associated with a hybridpostured group would not further U.S. interests. Instead, commanders should look for solutions that achieve long-term objectives and that can be explained in the global media as a primary, rather than secondary, consideration. Targeting outside sources of funding, training, and support may be more likely to bring down a group postured for hybrid war than a direct assault. Even, if the U.S. were willing to engage in a disproportionate response as a deterrent, there would be other, asymmetric ways to achieve that effect without an IDF style 62 General J. N. Mattis, Memorandum, 3. 63 Richard M. Crowell, -Analyzing Hybrid Warfare,‖ 9.
Conclusion
ground campaign. U.S. military commanders can gain insights into evolving methods of warfare by studying the recent IDF operations but should be wary of using them as a model for hybrid war.
